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Abstract
The 2-spin Ising model in statistical mechanics and the 2x2 normal
form game in game theory are compared. All configurations allowed
by the second are recovered by the first when the only concern is
about Nash equilibria. But it holds no longer when Pareto optimum
condiderations are introduced like in the prisoner’s dilemma. This
gap can nevertheless be filled by adding a new coupling term to the
Ising model, even if that term has up to now no physical meaning.
An individual complete bilinear objective function is thus found to be
sufficient to reproduce all possible configurations of a 2x2 game. Using
this one-to-one mapping, new perspectives for future research in both
fields can be envisioned.
1 Introduction
For two decades, statistical mechanics has been more and more used to study
economic systems (Kirman-Zimmermann, 2001; Bourgine-Nadal, 2004) as
well as financial ones (Bhamra, 2000). A well-known example is the applica-
tion of statistical mechanics to minority games at the basis of some financial
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problems (Coolen, 2005). Such a transfer is generally grounded on a raw anal-
ogy, both fields sharing the existence of numerous entities which are able to
be in specific states and interact among themselves. Each entity is governed
by the optimization of an objective function depending on the states of all of
them. The process leads to an overall equilibrium state. However, if the for-
mal frame is rather similar, the interpretation underlying the maximization
process is very different. While spins are inert objects which obey objective
laws, human beings follow an intentional behavior. Hence, the analogy is not
really substantial, but may nevertheless be valid at a formal level.
In this paper, two standard models of each discipline are compared, the
Ising model at zero temperature for statistical mechanics and the normal form
with Nash equilibrium for game theory. When both models are restricted to
two entities and two state variables, a detailed comparison becomes possible.
While in statistical mechanics the individual objective function is an explicit
truncated bilinear function in both entities, in game theory it is a quite gen-
eral function with no specification. On this basis, the possible configurations
of equilibrium states are computed in each case and systematically compared.
It appears that any configuration happening in the first case appears as
well in the second. However, when one introduces Pareto optimum consid-
erations like in the prisoner’s dilemma, this is no more true. However, the
prisoner’s dilemma missing configuration can be recovered by adding an ad-
ditive new term to the Ising objective function. This additional term makes
the associated bilinear function complete. It is a linear term which at present
has no physical meaning. Nevertheless, an individual bilinear objective func-
tion which is complete is sufficient to reproduce all possible configurations of
game theory.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. The second section
recalls the frameworks used in statistical mechanics and in game theory and
compares their respective assumptions. The third section analyzes the con-
figurations of equilibrium states obtained in games when using the restrictive
individual objective function of the Ising model. The fourth section shows
that the missing configuration can be recovered by considering a complete
individual bilinear objective function, but can no longer be obtained from
a collective objective function. Some perspectives for new research in both
fields using our mapping are discussed in the last section.
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2 Basic frameworks
2.1 Ising model
In statistical mechanics, the Ising model is most used. Rather powerful to
study magnetic systems, it was proven successful in describing a huge spec-
trum of different problems in other fields of physics. Numerous applications
have been also achieved outside physics in particular in sociophysics (Castel-
lano, Fortunato and Loreto, 2009; Galam, 2008).
The Ising model considers a group of N two-state variables called spins,
where each spin i = 1, ..., N , takes values denoted si = ±1. These spins
interact by pairs {i, j} via two exchange constants Jij and Jji whose effect is
to produce respectively a local field hj−→i = Jijsj from spin j on spin i and
a local field hi−→j = Jjisi from spin i on spin j.These fields couple linearly
with their associated spins giving rise to the two individual energies:
Ei = −hj−→isi = −Jijsjsi
Ej = −hi−→jsj = −Jjisisj
which are both bilinear functions of the spins.
The minus sign remembers that the energy is ultimately minimized. A
positive coupling Jij ≻ 0 corresponds to a ferromagnetic system and yields:
si = sj. A negative coupling Jij ≺ 0 corresponds to a antiferromagnetic
system and favors: si = −sj . The absence of coupling Jij = 0 makes both
values of si and sj independent one from the other.
Then, considering one spin si, all its interactions with the other (N − 1)
spins add up to result in a net local field:
Vi =
∑N
j=1 Jijsj , with Jii = 0
At this stage, in order to satisfy the principle of equality of action and
reaction which holds true for most physical applications, the exchange cou-
plings are taken symmetric: Jij = Jji
In addition, spins can be coupled linearly to a local field h˜i, which may
vary from spin to spin like in the random field model. It is independent
of the spin states. A uniform field h can also be applied to the system.
It couples linearly and simultaneously to every spin. These coupling terms
write respectively h˜isi and hsi. Both h˜i and h can be positive, negative
or null. In physics, discriminating between h˜i and h originated from the
different experimental schemes which produce them respectively. On a more
formal point of view, they can be combined within one single local variable:
hi = h˜i + h.
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The total local field becomes:
Vi =
∑N
j=1 Jijsj + hi
and the associated individual energy:
Ei = −
∑N
j=1 Jijsisj − hisi
It is worth to note that a self-coupling term with i = j may be included
in Ei. However since sisi = 1, it contributes a constant Jii to Ei, which
therefore does not influence the equilibrium state. In the special case where
Vi = 0, the associated spin si is said to be “frustrated” since neither si = +1
nor si = −1 can minimize Ei = 0. It makes a spin flip cost no energy.
The total energy of the N -spin system is then obtained by adding all
individual energies Ei which defines the Hamiltonian under two equivalent
forms:
H = −
∑
<i,j>
Jijsisj −
∑
i
hisi (1)
H′ = −
1
2
N∑
i,j=1
Jijsisj −
∑
i
hisi (2)
where < i, j > means all distinct pairs of interacting spins and 1/2 corrects
the double counting of each pair. In other circumstances, the system may
stabilize into some limit cycle.
The Hamiltonian measures the energy of a peculiar configuration {s1, s2, ..., sN}
given the external parameters {Jij , hi}. It is sufficient to describe the equi-
librium properties of the system.
Observe that minimizing the Hamiltonian with respect to the states {si}
is identical to minimizing each {Ei} with respect to si . However, it should be
emphasized that this feature is a direct result of the assumption of symmetric
couplings (Jij = Jji). Indeed, the term Jij may be virtually asymmetric
(Jij 6= Jji) . In that case, the energy function cannot characterize uniquely
the system since then the asymmetric part waves out in summing both terms
Jijsisj and Jjisjsi in H due to the commutation of si and sj resulting in
one average coupling term (Jij + Jji)/2 which is symmetric. Therefore, for
asymmetric couplings, a purely dynamical analysis is required making the
solving of the problem much more difficult.
Observe moreover that, on purely formal grounds, hi can be taken as
positive without restriction. Exchanging the sign of si preserves the value of
Ei if changing altogether the signs of Jij and hi.
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At this stage, to make the comparison to game theory straightforward, we
restrict the approach to two spins: N = 2,even if the physical interpretation
is dubious. The local fields becomes:
V1 = J21s2 + h1 and V2 = J12s1 + h2 (3)
The individual energies follow:
E1 = −J21s1s2 − h1s1 and V2 = −J12s1s2 − h2s2 (4)
Finally, the Hamiltonian reduces to:
H′
1,2 = −
1
2
(J12 + J21)s1s2 − h1s1 − h2s2. (5)
On this basis, the equilibrium state is obtained by a minimization of
H′ with respect to both {s1, s2} given {J12, J21, h1, h2}. Hence −H′ is a
collective objective function which is maximized with respect to the two
internal degrees of freedom{s1, s2}. Remember that h1 and h2 can be taken
positive without restriction.
In the case of symmetric exchange couplings (J12 = J21), the minimization
of E1 with respect to s1 and E2 with respect to s2 is precisely equivalent
to the minimization of H with respect to {s1, s2}. The functions E1 and
E2 are therefore individually minimized, hence their opposite are individual
objective functions which are maximized.
2.2 Game theory
In game theory, the standard “normal-form” is most used. It applies to many
economic applications as well as to applications in other fields like political
science or biology.
The framework considers a group of N players numerated with i =
1, ..., N . Each player i chooses some action si in a set Si,which is defined on a
nominal (discrete) scale rather than on a numerical one. The players interact
globally through their actions and reach some common consequences C for
each issue (s1, ...si, ...sN ) .These consequences are assessed by each player i
thanks to a utility or payoff function Ui = Ui(C) = Ui(s1, ..., si, ..., sN) . Such
a utility index is ordinal, hence the utility function, otherwise of any form,
is defined up to a monotone transformation. Finally, each player chooses his
action by maximizing his utility.
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Since the maximization implemented by some player depends on what
the other players do, an equilibrium notion has to be defined in order to
coordinate the players’ moves. A Nash equilibrium state is a stable state in a
fixed environment, provided that one player only is able to deviate from it at
a time. Technically, a (pure) Nash equilibrium state is an ’issue’ (or ’state’
or ’profile of actions’ (s∗
1
, ..., s∗i , ..., s
∗
N) where each action is a best response
to the others’ equilibrium actions:
s∗i = argmax
si
Ui(s
∗
1
, ..., si, ..., s
∗
N). (6)
In other terms, in an equilibrium state, no player has an incentive to deviate
unilaterally from his action:
Ui(s
∗
1
, ...s∗i , ...s
∗
N) ≥ Ui(s
∗
1
, ...si, ...s
∗
N ), ∀si. (7)
A Nash equilibrium is strict if and only if the inequality is strict for each
player. In fact, the equilibrium conditions state that if the players are placed
in an equilibrium state, they stay there. But they do not explain through
what dynamical process the players come to an equilibrium state.
The Nash equilibrium notion assumes that the players follow their own
individual interests (embedded in their utility function which gathers het-
erogenous motivations). The Pareto optimum notion considers a collective
point of view (however based on the individual utility functions). It asserts
that a state is a Pareto optimum if there exists no other available state which
is better for all players (and strictly better for one of them at least). Tech-
nically, it is defined in two steps. Firstly, an issue (s1, ..., si, ..., sN) Pareto-
dominates another issue (s′
1
, ..., s′i, ..., s
′
N) if it gives more utility to each player
(and strictly more to one of them)
Ui(s1, ...si, ...sN ) ≥ Ui(s
′
1
, ...s′i, ...s
′
N), ∀i, (8)
with one strict inequality. Secondly, a Pareto optimum is an issue which is
not Pareto-dominated by any other issue. However, even if a collective order
on global states is considered, no collective objective function is assumed to
exist.
The game is now restricted to two players and two actions per player, i.e.
a 2 x 2 game. It is usually represented by a matrix where the lines represent
the two actions s1
1
and s2
1
of the first player and the columns the two actions
s1
2
and s2
2
of the second player. At the intersection of an action for each
6
player, the bi-matrix indicates first the utility of the first player, then the
utility of the second player:
s1
2
s2
2
s1
1
s2
1 (U1(s
1
1
, s1
2
), U2(s
1
1
, s1
2
)) (U1(s
1
1
, s2
2
), U2(s
1
1
, s2
2
))
(U1(s
2
1
, s1
2
), U2(s
2
1
, s1
2
)) (U1(s
2
1
, s2
2
), U2(s
2
1
, s2
2
))
This bi-matrix has indeed quite a general form and can be written with
8 free parameters:
(a, a′) (b, b′)
(c, c′) (d, d′)
Two classes of games are of special interest. The symmetric games are
such that the two players play symmetric roles and get symmetric utilities:
a = a′, b = c′, c = b′, d = d′ . The zero-sum games are such that the utilities
of the players are opposite for each issue of the game: a = −a′, b = −b′, c =
−c′, d = −d′. In case of a symmetric game, it exists at least one equilibrium
state while in case of a zero-sum game, it exists at most one equilibrium
state.
In the bi-matrix, the (pure) Nash equilibria are obtained as ’wells’ of the
best response arrows relating horizontal or vertical issues in the matrix. The
Pareto optima are obtained by eliminating all dominated issues. The two
types of states need not to coincide. For instance, consider the game with:
a ≻ c ≻ d ≻ b, c′ = d′ ≻ a′ ≻ b′.The best responses, the Nash equilibria (a
strict Nash equilibrium is denoted N while a large one is denoted N ′ ) and
the Pareto optima (denoted P ) are the following :
N = P ←−
↑ ↓
P ←→ N ′
Observe that the equilibrium states are unchanged under a monotone
transformation of U1 and U2. Especially, they are not affected when adding
to U1 (and U2) a constant in the first column and another in the second:
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(a + λ, a′ + λ′) (b+ µ, b′ + µ′)
(c + λ, c′ + λ′) (d+ µ, d′ + µ′)
Likely, the Pareto-dominating issues are unchanged under a linear trans-
formation of U1 and U2. Especially, they are unchanged when adding to U1
(and U2) a same constant in all issues:
(a+ λ, a′ + λ′) (b+ λ, b′ + λ′)
(c+ λ, c′ + λ′) (d+ λ, d′ + λ′)
Note however that such transformations do not keep the symmetric or
zero-sum character of the game.
2.3 Correspondance between the frames
The two frameworks appear quite similar in their structure: a spin is re-
placed by a player, the state si by an action si , the local energy −Ei by a
utility function Ui, a physical equilibrium by a Nash equilibrium. But the
Hamiltonian H has no counterpart since no collective utility (linear or not)
is defined. However, the physical structure is logically stronger than the
game structure since the state is quantified and the energy is more specific
(truncated bilinear function of the variables).
The physical problem can be transformed into a game problem by con-
structing an equivalent normal form for a game. The 2 x 2 matrix gives
in each issue the energy of spins 1 and 2, the issues corresponding to the
combinations of first and second states for the spins. We thus get the ’Ising
game’ matrix which is comparable to the one obtained from game theory:
s1
2
= +1 s2
2
= −1
s1
1
= +1
s2
1
= −1 (J12 + h1, J21 + h2) (−J12 + h1,−J21 − h2)
(−J12 − h1,−J21 + h2) (J12 − h1, J21 − h2)
The same previous general form can be used, but it involves now only 4
free parameters since the off diagonal payoffs depend on the diagonal payoffs
in the following way:
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(α, α′) (−δ,−α′)
(−α,−δ′) (δ, δ′)
with α = J12 + h1, α
′ = J21 + h2, δ = J12 − h1 and δ′ = J21 − h2.
Note that the correspondance can be reversed since J12 = (α + δ)/2, h1 =
(α− δ)/2, J21 = (α′ + δ′)/2, h2 = (α′ − δ′)/2.
The Ising game is symmetric when α = α′ and δ = δ′, which involves
that: J12 = J21 and h1 = h2. It is zero-sum when α = δ = −α
′ = −δ′,which
involves J12 = −J21 and h1 = h2 = 0.
If we are interested only in equilibrium states, it is always possible to
change a usual game into an equivalent Ising game by adding to the utilities
some specific constants:
λ = −(a + c)/2, µ = −(b+ d)/2, λ′ = −(a′ + c′)/2, µ′ = −(b′ + d′)/2 .
The new utilities become related to the old ones as follows:
α = (a− c)/2, δ = (d− b)/2, α′ = (a′ − c′)/2, δ′ = (d′ − b′)/2.
Moreover, the physical parameters can be directly related to the old util-
ities:
J12 = (a− b− c+ d)/2, h1 = (a+ b− c− d),
J21 = (a
′ − b′ − c′ + d′)/2, h2 = (a′ + b′ − c′ − d′)
However, if we are interested in Pareto optima, the same operation cannot
be done since the constants generally differ along lines and columns.
3 Comparison of equilibrium states
3.1 Taxonomy of 2x2 games
In general 2x2 games, we are looking for the different types of equilibrium
configurations that may happen. For this, it is enough to consider that the
payoffs of a player are defined up to a monotone transformation, hence are
defined on an ordinal scale. Even more we have only to consider the relative
position of the payoffs leading to the best responses. It means that we have
just to compare a to c and b to d. Such a reasoning concerns in fact the
vertical arrows in the basic scheme. We obtain only 9 combinations:
- 2 combinations A without ties and opposite moves:↑↓ or ↓↑
- 2 combinations B without ties and parallel moves: ↑↑ or ↓↓
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- 2 combinations C with one tie right:↑l or ↓l
- 2 combinations D with one tie left:l↑ or l↓
- 1 combination E with two ties:ll
For two players, we obtain in principle 9x9=81 combinations. But a
matrix obtained by exchanging lines or columns gives the same equilibrium
states since there is only a change of label of the actions. However, for some
matrices, exchanging lines or columns can lead to the same matrix. In fact,
the exchange properties of the different combinations are the following:
- combinations A exchange themselves when exchanging lines and simi-
larly when exchanging columns.
- combinations B exchange themseves when exchanging lines and are in-
variant when exchanging columns
- combinations C exchange themselves when changing lines and lead to
configurations D when exchanging columns
- combinations D exchange themselves when changing lines and lead to
configurations C when exchanging columns
- combination E is invariant when changing lines as well as when changing
columns.
It is clear that only one of the two combinations B, C and D needs to
be kept for each player since the other is obtained by exchanging the lines
(for player 1) and the columns (for player 2). Similarly, the unique combina-
tion E has to be kept. A first problem happens however with configurations
A. Keeping one combination for player 1 is enough when crossing with any
other combination for player 2. But when crossing one combination A for
player 1 and one combination B for player 2 is not enough since two differ-
ent configurations are concretely produced. A second problem appears with
configuration E. Since it is completely symmetric, its adoption by player 1
gives the same configuration against the combinations C and D of player 2,
hence one has to be deleted.
The following table makes precise the 15 different configurations that can
be obtained:
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A B C D E
A
−→
↑ [1] ↓
←−
N ←−
↑ [2] ↓
−→ N
N ←−
↑ [3] ↓
←−
N ←−
↑ [5] ↓
←→ N ′
N ′ ←→
↑ [8] ↓
←−
N ′ ←→
↑ [12] ↓
←→ N ′
B
N ←−
↑ [4] ↑
←−
N ←−
↑ [6] ↑
←→
N ′ ←→ N ′
↑ [9] ↑
←−
N ′ ←→ N ′
↑ [13] ↑
←→
C
N ←−
↑ [7] l
←→ N ′
N ′ ←→ N ′
↑ [10] l
←−
N ′ ←→ N ′
↑ [14] l
←→ N ′
D
N ′ ←→ N ′
l [11] ↑
N ′ ←−
E
N ′ ←→ N ′
l [15] l
N ′ ←→ N ′
The four configurations without ties are the basic ones and can each can
be illustrated by a specific example:
- configuration 1 corresponds to the absence of a Nash equilibrium state.
It is illustrated by “matching pennies” where both players exhibit one of the
two sides of a personal penny; the first wins if the two pennies are on the
same side while the second wins if they are on opposite sides
(1,−1) (−1, 1)
(−1, 1) (1,−1)
- configuration 2 corresponds to two Nash equilibrium states. A first sub-
case happens when the two equilibria cannot be compared: one is better for
the first player and the other is better for the second player. It is illustrated
by the “battle of the sexes” where player 1 is the husband and player 2 the
wife; for the husband, the first action consists in going to boxing and the
second to ballet; for the wife, the first action consists in going to ballet and
the second to boxing; the utility of preferred entertainment is 2 and the util-
ity of being together to 4. A second subcase happens when one equilibrium
Pareto dominates the other. It is illustrated by the “stag hunt game” where
for each player, the first action consists in hunting a rabbit and the second a
deer; the rabbit can be hunt alone and provides then a utility of 1; the deer
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can only be hunt conjointly and provides a utility of 7 for each; if only one
player hunts the deer, he will starve and his utility is -1.
(2, 2) (6, 4)
(4, 6) (0, 0)
(7, 7) (−1, 1)
(1,−1) (1, 1)
- configuration 4 corresponds to one Nash equilibrium obtained by domi-
nant actions for each player. A first subcase happens when the Nash equilib-
rium is not Pareto dominated by another issue. It is illustrated by the ”lonely
game” where each player buys a toy independently from the other’s action;
the utility of the toy for each player is +1 and the desutility of not buying
is -1. A second subcase happens when the Nash equilibrium is Pareto dom-
inated by another issue. It is illustrated by the ”prisoner’s dilemma”where
for each player, the first action consists in defecting and the second in co-
operating; they get utility 2 if both defect, utility 4 if both cooperate, but
if one cooperates without the other, he receives 0 and the other receives 6;
the only equilibrium state is the issue (2,2); but the last is not a Pareto
optimum (contrary to all other three issues) since it is Pareto-dominated by
the opposite issue (4,4)
(1, 1) (1,−1)
(−1, 1) (−1,−1)
(2, 2) (6, 0)
(0, 6) (4, 4)
3.2 Taxonomy of Ising games
The Nash equilibrium states can be computed and the configurations they
determine depend only on the relation between Jij and hi. The matrix defined
by these parameters isolate 25 basic configurations. For each configuration,
the scheme of best responses in the 2 x 2 matrix is defined in the following
table in which h1and h2 are strictly positive:
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J21 < −h2 J21 = −h2 −h2 < J21 < h2 J21 = h2 J21 > h2
J12 < −h1
−→ N
↓ [2] ↑
N ←−
←→ N ′
↓ [5] ↑
N ←−
←−
↓ [3] ↑
N ←−
←−
↓ [8] ↑
N ′ ←→
←−
↓ [1] ↑
−→
J12 = −h1
−→ N
l [5] ↑
N ′ ←−
N ′ ←→ N ′
l [11] ↑
N ′ ←−
N ′ ←−
l [9] ↑
N ′ ←−
N ′ ←−
l [10] ↑
N ′ ←→
N ′ ←−
l [8] ↑
−→
−h1 < J12
J12 < h1
−→ N
↑ [3] ↑
←−
N ′ ←→ N ′
↑ [9] ↑
←−
N ←−
↑ [4] ↑
←−
N ←−
↑ [6] ↑
←→
N ←−
↑ [3] ↑
−→
J12 = h1
−→ N ′
↑ [8] l
←−
N ′ ←→ N ′
↑ [10] l
←−
N ←−
↑ [6] l
←−
N ←−
↑ [7] l
←→ N ′
N ←−
↑ [5] l
−→ N ′
J12 > h1
−→
↑ [1] ↓
←−
N ′ ←→
↑ [8] ↓
←−
N ←−
↑ [3] ↓
←−
N ←−
↑ [5] ↓
←→ N ′
N ←−
↑ [2] ↓
−→ N
The preceding table has to be completed by a table where h1 = 0, h2 > 0 (or
symetrically):
J21 < −h2 J21 = −h2 −h2 < J21 < h2 J21 = h2 J21 > h2
J12 < 0
−→ N
↓ [2] ↑
N ←−
←→ N ′
↓ [5] ↑
N ←−
←−
↓ [3] ↑
N ←−
←−
↓ [8] ↑
N ←→
←−
↓ [1] ↑
−→
J12 = 0
−→ N ′
l [12] l
N ′ ←−
N ′ ←→ N ′
l [14] l
N ′ ←−
N ′ ←−
l [13] l
N ′ ←−
N ′ ←−
l [14] l
N ′ ←→ N ′
N ←−
l [12] l
−→
J12 > 0
−→
↑ [1] ↓
←−
N ←→
↑ [8] ↓
←−
N ←−
↑ [3] ↓
←−
N ←−
↑ [5] ↓
←→ N ′
N ←−
↑ [2] ↓
−→ N
Finally, a last table is obtained when h1 = h2 = 0 :
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J21 < 0 J21 = 0 J21 > 0
J12 < 0
−→ N ′
↓ [2] ↑
N ′ ←−
←→ N ′
↓ [12] ↑
N ′ ←→
←−
↓ [1] ↑
−→
J12 = 0
−→ N ′
l [12] l
N ′ ←−
N ′ ←→ N ′
l [15] l
N ′ ←→ N ′
N ′ ←−
l [12] l
−→ N ′
J12 > 0
−→
↑ [1] ↓
←−
N ′ ←→
↑ [12] ↓
←→ N ′
N ′ ←−
↑ [2] ↓
−→ N ′
Of course, many configurations appear twice by symmetry. But more
important, all configurations appear as expected. The first table gives con-
figurations 1 to 11. The second table adds the configurations 12 to 14. The
third table adds the configuration 15.
Notice that the game may be symmetric only in configurations 2, 4, 7 ,11
and 15. It can be checked that it then admits at least one equilibrium state.
Likely, the game may be zero-sum only in configurations 1 and 15. It then
admits either zero or four Nash equilibrium states .
The games without ties can be obtained from Ising models for specific
parameters:
- configuration 1 (no equilibrium state) is obtained when JijJji < 0 and
| Jij |>| hi | .Especially, matching pennies is obtained with J12 = 1, J21
= −1 and h1 = h2 = 0.
- configuration 2 (two strict equilibrium states) is obtained when JijJji >
0 and | Jij |>| hi | . Especially, the battle of sexes is obtained with J12 =
J21 = −2 and h1 = h2 = 1 and a general translation of utility of 3.The stag
hunt game is obtained with J12 = J21 = 2 and h1 = h2 = +1 and a general
translation of utility of 4
- configuration 4 (one strict equilibrium state) is obtained when | Jij |<|
hi | . Especially, the lonely game is obtained for J12 = J21 = 0 and h1 = h2 =
1
.
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4 Extended framework
4.1 Missing configurations
In the preceding framework, only the point of view of Nash equilibrium states
was considered. A Nash equilibrium corresponds to a state where the players
may stay, when they are astrained to strictly follow their own interest. But
the game theorists are interested in Pareto optima too (especially when they
coincide with equilibrium states). The reason is that an issue which is not
Pareto optimal is not collectively satisfying since the players may move to a
better issue for both, however by coordinating their actions.
Consider an Ising game where the North-West issue (α, α′) is an equilib-
rium and the South-West issue (δ, δ′) is not. The corresponding conditions
are α ≻ 0 , α′ ≻ 0 and δ ≺ 0, δ′ ≺ 0. It follows immediatly that the North-
West issue (α, α′) Pareto-dominates the South-West one (δ, δ′). The opposite
dominance is not possible, hence some games which precisely show such an
opposite dominance cannot be represented by Ising games.
For instance, consider the ”prisoner’s dilemma”. The North-West issue
(where both players defect) is the only equilibrium state . The South-West
issue (where both players cooperate) is better for both players to the opposite
one. Hence, the prisoner’s dilemma, with its specific structure of a unique
Nash equilibrium Pareto-dominated by a non equilibrium issue, cannot be
written as an Ising game.
4.2 Enlarged framework
In order to recover the missing configuration within the Ising model and thus
get a full matching of configurations, the simplest way is to add to the local
energy of each spin an ’altruistic’ term kisj, which depends exclusively on
the other spin state:
− Ei = −
∑
j
Jijsisj − hisi − kisj. (9)
In fact, such an operation transforms, for player i, his initial payoff in
a payoff where ki is added in the first column and where ki is substracted
in the second column. Such an operation does not change the equilibrium
states (even if it changes the payoffs at equilibrium), but does change the
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Pareto states. The ’extended Ising game’ writes now in the form of a general
game:
s1
2
= +1 s2
2
= −1
s1
1
= +1
s2
1
= −1 (J12 + h1 + k1, J21 + h2 + k2) (−J12 + h1 − k1,−J21 − h2 + k2)
(−J12 − h1 + k1,−J21 + h2 − k2) (J12 − h1 − k1, J21 − h2 − k2)
This matrix is written under the form:
(a, a′) (b, b
′
)
(c, c′) (d, d
′
)
with a = J12 + h1 + k1, b = −J12 + h1 − k1 , c = −J12 − h1 + k1 and
d = J12 − h1 − k1 for player 1 and similarly for player 2. However, the
coefficients of the first player still obey the constraint: a+ b+ c+ d = 0 (and
symmetrically for the second). But this condition can always be reached
from the original matrix by substracting to the coefficients of the first player
a constant (a+ b+ c+ d)/4 to all payoffs (without changing the equilibrium
and Pareto states). The preceding formulas can then be reversed (for the
first player):
J12 = (a− b− c+ d)/4 = (a− b− c+ d)/4
h1 = (a+ b− c− d)/4 = (a+ b− c− d)/4
k1 = (a− b+ c− d)/4 = (a− b+ c− d)/4
Hence, a complete bilinear function is sufficient to obtain all possible config-
urations.
For instance, the prisoner’s dilemma is obtained by setting J12 = J21 = 0 ,
h1 = h2 = 1 and k1 = k2 = −2, and applying a general payoff transformation
of +3.
4.3 The ’altruistic’ term
At this stage, two comments can be made about the ’altruistic term’ added
to the energy of each spin. First, this term has no clear interpretation in
statistical mechanics. Second, the completed energy cannot be deduced from
a collective single Hamiltonian.
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If such an Hamiltonian existed, he would be obtained by ’integrating’ the
new energy of each spin Vi, obtained by divising −Ei by si :
V1 =
∂H
∂s1
= J12s2 + h1 + k1s2/s1 (10)
V2 =
∂H
∂s2
= J21s1 + h2 + k2s1/s2 (11)
But since the second derivatives ∂
2H
∂s1∂s2
and ∂
2H
∂s2∂s1
differ, the Hamiltonian
does not exist.
Conversely, consider the Hamiltonian obtained by adding the energy of
both spins.
H′ = J12s1s2 + J21s1s2 + h1s1 + h2s2 + k1s2 + k2s1 (12)
It leads to individual spin energies which are not the good ones, but it
allows to find the Pareto optimum in the prisoner’s dilemma. Hence, the
missing configuration, contrary to the other ones, cannot be obtained by
minimizing a Hamiltonian.
5 Further extensions
Extension to continuous positions for each entity is usual in games as well as
in statistical mechanics and their comparison can be extended. But exten-
sion to N entities creates a further divergence between statistical mechanics
and game theory. In statistical mechanics, the energy of a spin is gener-
ally generated by summarizing its bilateral interactions with all other spins.
Multilateral interactions are possible in some cases, but are more difficult
to handle mathematically. In economics, the utility is directly defined on a
multilateral basis, by a general dependence on all others’ actions. Again, it is
not specified, but only submitted to very general conditions. It follows that
the additional term(s) needed to recover a general function from a partial
one will be intricate.
Two problems stay common to statistical mechanics and game theory. In
both cases, the equilibrium state is defined from outside (by the modeler) as
a state which remains stable without perturbations from the environment.
But the concrete process leading to some well-defined equilibrium state is
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not formally described. Hence, the ’implementation problem’ states that the
process leading to an equilibrium state has to be made explicit. Likely, the
’selection problem’ states that the way one equilibrium state is sorted out in
case of multiplicity has to be made explicit, in relation with the preceding
one. In physics, a random selection is often assumed with equiprobability.
In game theory, two justifications of an equilibrium notion were recently
proposed and duly formalized (Walliser, 2006). The epistemic justifications
assume that the players are hyper-intelligent and are able to reach instanta-
neously an equilibrium state by their sole reasoning. Moreover, the players
select one equilibrium state through shared ’conventions’, for instance focal
points (culturally induced). The evolutionist justifications assume that the
players have a bounded rationality and follow a sequential learning or evolu-
tion process leading asymptotically to an equilibrium state. In that case, an
equilibrium state is automatically selected at least probabilistically by the
initial conditions and the history of the system.
In statistical mechanics, only the second option is open since the spins
can hardly be assumed to hold beliefs and to deliberate. Nevertheless the
sociophysics approach has proven possible to substitute individuals to spins
as long as the assumptions made are formally equivalent. In fact, various
schemes were proposed in order to describe the local dynamic genesis of
an equilibrium state, with more or less justifications. They allow the con-
vergence towards an equilibrium state by using the concept of spontaneous
symmetry breaking.
Finally, statistical mechanics studies the system of spins even when the
temperature differs from zero. A spin is then in some state with a probabil-
ity precisely defined which decreases with its energy and increases with the
inverse of the temperature. In game theory, the corresponding situation hap-
pens when a player chooses an action with a probability generically defined
which increases with its utility and depends on some parameter characteriz-
ing the ’exploration- exploitation’ dilemma. The corresponding equilibrium
states have to be further compared.
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